// HACKER NEWS — CYBERSECURITY
Show HN: Prove your code produced your claims without making reviewers rerun it
Tamper-evident verification for computational experiments. It binds a published result to the exact code, hardware, and time that produced it, in a cryptographically signed PDF anyone can verify. Works with any language, zero runtime dependencies, single static binary.
Platform. Verify, seal, proofs, checkout, benchmark artifacts, provenance, and disclosure levels are cross-platform. The file/subprocess activity map and per-process hardware attribution are Linux-only today; elsewhere they fall back to system-wide readings.
Binaries: kveritas-{linux,darwin,windows}-{amd64,arm64}. Or build from source (Go 1.22+): make build.
Print these to stdout in any language; everything captured is bound into the signed record.
Common metrics are also auto-detected (Keras history, sklearn CV, metric-like locals), so simple runs need no lines.
Metric-blind. It never looks at the reported result. During the run a background sampler records per-process telemetry (CPU, memory, context switches, page faults, CPU frequency, I/O, and, when a GPU is used, its utilization, memory, power, temperature) at about 10 Hz. At seal time HMCA scores whether those channels co-fluctuate as shadows of one process: a genuine run drives them all from one activity, a fabricated or replayed trace does not. Verdict is PASS (coherent), WARN, FAIL (incoherent), or N/A (too little telemetry to judge). A light run is judged on the activity it has, never penalized for being light. The web verifier renders the channels over time.
When a run declares a model card, seal produces a certificate checking the declared FLOPs against what the hardware could physically deliver.
The time bound sums every device, so it fires whether the work ran on GPU, CPU, or both (a 175B model declared on an idle CPU is caught). Bounds are generous, so honest runs pass; no card or no telemetry is N/A. A hard violation is FABRICATION-IMPOSSIBLE, bound into the signature.
Each run is a signed timeline of content-addressed snapshots (source state at run start, each phase, and run end, plus what changed), Merkle-linked and bound into the signature. You choose per session how much is revealed; this controls disclosure only, integrity is always committed.
A redacted report reveals nothing sensitive (no code, names, data, weights, command line, or salt); the server only ever receives a hash. Patterns in .kveritasignore keep files out of any bundle; a withheld file is still committed as a hash-only leaf and listed as withheld, so it cannot be silently dropped.